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Morocco’s Slow Motion Reform Process 
The Tug of War between the Palace and the Justice and Development Party 
Mohammed Masbah 
The October 2013 government reshuffle in Morocco marks the latest round in the 
drawn-out tug of war between the Palace and the Justice and Development Party (Parti 
de la justice et du développement, PJD), which heads the ruling coalition. The Palace 
came out as the clear winner, and thereby managed to roll back some of the limited 
concessions granted in response to the protests in early 2011. Regional dynamics – 
support from the Arab Gulf monarchies and authoritarian reconstruction in Egypt 
after the July 2013 coup – and the dispute between the PJD and its coalition partner, 
the Istiqlal (Independence) Party (Parti de l’istiqlal, PI), worked to the Palace’s advan-
tage. Even though the relation between the PJD and the Palace has ameliorated con-
siderably compared to one decade ago, the Palace’s strategic aim is to weaken the party 
while at the same time using it to stabilize the regime. In the short term, and as long 
as the PJD is able to retain popular support, it will remain in office and retain a limited 
margin of maneuver for reform. Profound political reforms as well as structural socio-
economic and judicial reforms, however, are likely to be postponed to the mid to long 
term. European Union policy makers should use the EU’s long and close relations with 
the Palace to encourage it to allow more substantial reform and cede power to the 
elected government. 
 
At first glance, the Moroccan government 
reshuffle of 10 October 2013 might seem as 
a minor bump in the road. Yet it came after 
a government coalition crisis that lasted 
for nearly six months. It is significant not 
only with respect to the relationship be-
tween Morocco’s strongest political party – 
the moderate Islamist PJD – and the Palace, 
but also with regards to the prospects for 
a democratic transition. What first looked 
like a withdrawal of the monarchy from 
executive power in 2011 now appears much 
more like a temporary retreat in the face 
of the wave of protest that shook the Moroc-
can regime in early 2011, which has now 
been all but reversed. 
Royal arbitrage 
The decision of the new PI leadership to 
withdraw from the coalition government – 
which had been formed after the 2011 elec-
tions by the PJD (107 of a total of 395 seats), 
along with the PI (60), the Popular Move-
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ment (32), and the Party of Progress and 
Socialism (18) – provided the opening 
for the monarchy to return center stage 
through the PJD’s coalition partners. Right 
after he was elected in January 2013, the 
new Independence Party’s Secretary-Gen-
eral, Abdelhamid Chabat, had adopted an 
assertive stand vis-à-vis his coalition partner 
PJD. Based on a conservative interpretation 
of article 42 of the 2011 constitution, 
which invests the King with the authority 
to be “Supreme Arbiter between the insti-
tutions,” the PI’s new leadership called 
upon the King to arbitrate in the dispute 
with the PJD. The latter argued that article 
42 makes the King arbiter between “insti-
tutions,” that is, the three branches of gov-
ernment (executive, legislative, and judi-
cial), rather than between political parties, 
and described the proposal as “blackmail” 
by the PI’s new leadership. 
On the surface, the King remained aloof 
of these struggles, leaving the country for 
two months (May and June) in the midst of 
the crisis and later criticized the bickering 
parties in a speech in August without com-
ing down on either side. Yet, given the mon-
archy’s long history of devising strategies of 
divide and rule – and the benefits it draws 
from appearing as a non-partisan arbiter be-
tween the political camps – some analysts 
suspected that circles close to the Palace 
had a hand in the PI’s decision to withdraw 
from government in the first place. This 
interpretation is backed by strong indica-
tions that some circles in the Palace in-
fluenced internal party elections in the PI, 
as well as in the Socialist Union of Popular 
Forces respectively, to install leaders who 
would not cooperate with the PJD, even 
against the mood in the parties. 
The price of governing 
Initially, the PJD showed no public reaction 
to the PI’s withdrawal. Eventually, in early 
November, Prime Minister Abdelilah Benki-
rane came out with a positive evaluation of 
the coalition breakup, stating that the rela-
tions between the coalition partners and 
the new PI Secretary-General had reached 
an impasse. The breakup left the PJD – as 
the strongest party in the Moroccan parlia-
ment – with only two options: to form a 
new coalition with different partners, or to 
go for early elections. 
On the one hand – from a technical, 
financial, and political perspective – early 
elections appeared as a far too expensive 
option for the Palace and the PJD. There 
were different reasons for this: technical 
and logistical preparations would have 
required at least six months – at a cost of 
at least 700 million MAD (around 85 mil-
lion USD) – leaving the country adrift and 
discouraging investors amidst a difficult 
economic situation. Politically, the Palace 
was concerned over massive potential gains 
for the PJD or a very low turnout, and the 
PJD was concerned about potential elec-
toral fraud. At the same time, a minority 
government would have threatened in-
stability. 
On the other hand, only two other par-
ties had enough seats to substitute for the 
PI and thus form a new parliamentary 
majority, both of them being parties that 
were created by royal advisors or their net-
works: the Authenticity and Modernity Party 
(Parti Authenticité et Modernité, PAM), with 
47 seats in parliament, and the National 
Rally of Independents (Rassemblement 
National des Indépendants, RNI) (52 seats). 
Given their long history of mutual ani-
mosity and ideological differences, a coali-
tion between PJD and PAM was unlikely. 
The RNI, as a party of businessmen who do 
not care about ideology, seemed the better 
choice, even if the PJD and the RNI are con-
sidered bitter rivals. 
As a consequence, the PJD was obliged to 
make painful concessions to remain in gov-
ernment. In July 2013, Benkirane started 
coalition negotiations with the RNI. This 
decision was accompanied by strong inter-
nal controversy as well as public debate. 
After all, the RNI had been a leading force 
in the anti-PJD campaign by an eight-party 
coalition during the 2011 parliamentary 
elections termed mockingly as the “G8”. 
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Also, accusations of corruption against RNI 
Secretary-General and former Minister of 
Finance Salaheddine Mezouar were seen as 
potentially compromising the credibility 
of the Islamist party in its fight against cor-
ruption, which was one of the PJD’s major 
political platforms. The cabinet reshuffle 
also implied the loss of important posts. 
Namely, the foreign ministry went to the 
RNI, whereas other PJD ministers were 
relegated to less influential positions. The 
most striking development was the en-
trance of several non-partisan, pro-Palace 
technocrats into the cabinet. The Palace 
and the Palace-backed RNI thus were the 
eventual winners of the cabinet crisis and 
the reshuffle. 
PJD-Palace relations 
To comprehend the nature of relations 
between the PJD and the Palace, it is im-
portant to highlight three main issues: 
(1) perceptions, (2) the constitution and its 
interpretation, and (3) conflicting interests. 
The PJD leadership believes that any 
substantial political achievement has to 
be based on a strategic consensus with the 
Palace. Their participation in government 
has enhanced this conviction, even though 
it has been quite a difficult undertaking, 
given the Palace’s perception of Islamists 
in general – and the PJD in particular – as 
competitors to the King’s religious author-
ity, in addition to the latter’s insistence on 
remaining the ultimate political arbiter 
and reference. As a consequence, the rela-
tionship between the Palace and the PJD 
has been oscillating between tense periods 
– when elections approach – and less tense 
periods over the past decade, and trust-
building has been a laborious process, 
despite the party leadership’s repeated 
reassurance of loyalty to the monarchy. 
The 2011 constitutional amendments 
shifted the balance of power between the 
King and the government by giving the 
latter more competencies. For example, 
according to the 2011 constitution, the 
head of government has to be chosen from 
the party that wins the parliamentary elec-
tions. He has the right to appoint more 
than one thousand senior officials directly, 
whereas all other senior official have to 
be proposed by the respective ministers, 
accepted by the PM, and can only then be 
nominated by the King. The text does, how-
ever, contain many ambiguities and does 
not substantially diminish the King’s power 
– for example, he remains the head of the 
ministerial council, which takes strategic 
decisions. 
Curiously, even though the Palace is 
not even mentioned in the constitution 
with regards to day-to-day policy-making, 
the King and his advisors play a pivotal role 
in decision-making. They do so through an 
intricate web of influence and allegiances 
spun between the Palace, the Moroccan 
elite, and key institutions, the so-called 
Makhzen, which wield influence on strategic 
decisions and mediate between actors – and 
at times sabotage governments. Since these 
relations are entirely informal, the exact 
influence is impossible to gauge, though it 
is a common perception in Morocco that 
royal advisors wield more power than min-
isters. Thus, if government officials desire 
to achieve results, they need the consent of 
the royal advisors, who function as the gate-
keepers of the Palace and can provide short-
cuts to political achievement as much as 
they can obstruct them – through media 
campaigns, over-taxation of private com-
panies, pressure on judges, and disciplinary 
measures against officials such as relega-
tion, etc. 
Prior to his appointment as head of 
government, Benkirane had declared that 
there would be no mediators between him 
and the King. Yet, in practice, he and his 
coalition partners remain obliged to pass 
major initiatives through the royal advis-
ors, who retain the power to put sticks into 
the wheel of the government’s work, par-
ticularly when the Makhzen’s economic and 
symbolic interests are at stake. 




Conflicts of interests have become obvious 
several times during the last two years. At 
the economic level, two examples illustrate 
these conflicts. First, in May 2012, the PJD 
Minister of Equipment and Transport, 
Abdelaziz Rabbah, started to publish lists 
of individuals benefiting from inter-city 
transport licenses – many of which are 
granted as royal favors to artists, football 
players, local notables, etc. This mostly sym-
bolic move, presented as part of a broader 
project to combat the system of patronage 
and enhance transparency and competi-
tion, was harshly criticized as populist by 
several pro-Palace parties and their media 
outlets. Many top officials have benefited 
over the years from such non-competitive 
licensing practices, not only in transport, 
but also in fishing, sand quarries, real 
estate, etc. This instrument has also been 
used as a tool of patronage and for buying 
off local notables and businesspeople. The 
initiative thus threatened their interests. 
Second, in June 2012, three PJD deputies 
representing the northern city of Tangiers 
were disqualified and lost their seats in par-
liament through a decision of the Consti-
tutional Court. Nominally, the mandates 
were withdrawn because the PJD’s cam-
paign posters featured a mosque in the 
background, and were therefore interpret-
ed by the court as using religious symbols 
against the rules. However, the decision 
was widely interpreted as a message to the 
PJD Minister of Governance, Najib Boulif, 
likewise from Tangier, and seen in the 
context of his project to reform the system 
of subsidies, the so-called compensation 
fund. Invalidating the three parliamentary 
nominations was therefore interpreted as 
a signal from the Makhzen that the reform 
ought to be shelved. With an overall value 
of up to 50 billion MAD (around 6.1 billion 
USD), the fund represents 6 percent of 
Morocco’s GDP. It provides subsidies for 
basic necessities, such as cereals and sugar 
as well as petroleum products. In 2012, it 
absorbed almost 20 percent of state rev-
enues. The main approach of the reform 
project is to gradually substitute the sub-
sidies through direct cash transfers to poor 
families as well as wage increases. 
The reasons behind the resistance to 
such reforms can be understood at three 
levels: (1) the reform threatens to under-
mine the Makhzen’s economic interests, as 
many of the royal or pro-Palace companies 
are directly or indirectly benefiting from 
the compensation fund; (2) the reform 
might entail destabilizing effects for the 
regime in case of dramatic price increases; 
and (3) the reform can be interpreted as a 
golden gift to the PJD, as the PJD govern-
ment would provide cash transfers to mil-
lions of Moroccans for the first time, which 
would immensely increase its popularity. 
At the political and symbolic levels, 
several standoffs between the government 
and the Makhzen have occurred over the last 
two years. The most remarkable one took 
place in August 2013, when, on the occa-
sion of Spanish King Juan Carlos’ official 
state visit, King Mohammed VI issued a 
royal pardon for 48 Spaniards imprisoned 
in Morocco. One of the pardoned was 
Daniel Galván Viña, a pedophile convicted 
of raping and filming 11 children. When 
the lawyer of one of the raped children 
from the Moroccan Association of Human 
Rights made the pardon public, public out-
rage ensued, leading to several protests 
against the King’s decision within a week’s 
time. At the same time, the PJD Minister 
of Justice and Freedoms, Mustapha Ramid, 
issued a statement pointing out that, 
according to article 58 of the constitution, 
royal pardons are the exclusive prerogative 
of the King, while at the same time denying 
that his ministry had any relation to the 
issue. In reaction, some Islamist intellectu-
als escalated their demands, calling for a 
far-reaching reform of the monarchy, in-
creasing the transparency of its decision-
making and budget, and clarifying the 
responsibilities of positions and function-
aries. Although the Palace, for the first time 
in its history, immediately retracted the 
pardon, the royal entourage was enraged 
about the way the government had dis-
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tanced itself, leaving the King to face direct 
criticism and an upsurge of mass protests 
for the first time since the 2011 demonstra-
tions. 
Pragmatic politics 
In sum, the Palace has not attempted to 
completely stall the PJD in government. 
Rather, it has sought to control the speed 
of reforms and has interfered only when 
reforms appear to directly or indirectly 
affect royal interests. It has supported 
measures that are of mutual benefit. For 
instance, it has lent its full support to the 
reform of the justice system – one of the 
strategic projects that both the PJD and 
the Palace prioritize. Also, in July 2013, 
the King honored Mustapha Ramid for 
his efforts of justice reform. 
In turn, as with all other legal political 
parties, the PJD has adapted itself to the 
rules and limits set by the Makhzen. It has, 
in the last two decades, gone through a 
series of political and ideological adapta-
tions that bespeak pragmatism, such as 
the acceptance of the monarchy, the self-
limitation of its participation to a limited 
number of districts, the acceptance of 
the interior ministry’s supervision of elec-
tions, etc. During the 2011 protests, the PJD 
neither called for participation nor con-
demned the movement. And while some of 
its leaders and youth members participated 
in the protests in their individual capacity, 
the party, by not joining them, prioritized 
stability over what it described as an “un-
certain adventure,” and took care not to 
undermine the trust it had been trying 
to build with the Palace. 
The government’s achievements 
Buoyed by the political successes of Islamist 
parties in Tunisia and Egypt, in 2011, the 
PJD had waged an ambitious electoral cam-
paign that concentrated on fighting corrup-
tion and authoritarianism, redistribution 
of wealth, and economic development. The 
PJD-led coalition then proposed a govern-
mental program in which it stressed, above 
all, the strengthening of the rule of law; 
decentralization; good governance; the 
building of a strong, diversified, competi-
tive, and productive national economy, 
guaranteeing an equitable distribution of 
wealth; and the development of a social 
program providing for basic needs. In the 
Moroccan public, four main areas of reform 
received special attention: the compensa-
tion fund, the judiciary, the retirement 
system, and the tax system. These reforms 
would not only be significant to improve 
citizens’ well-being, but they would also 
imply a shift from a rentier economy to a 
more competitive and productive economic 
model and good governance. 
Given the complexity of the Moroccan 
political sphere, the variety of actors inter-
vening, and their conflicting interests, the 
reform process has been in slow motion. It 
has, on the one hand, been delayed because 
some reforms need prior or parallel reform 
in other areas. For example, this is the case 
with the tax reform that needs to build 
on the integration of the informal sector – 
which employs around 30 percent of the 
workforce and contributes an estimated 
44 percent to the GDP – into the formal 
economy. Such an endeavor would possibly 
trigger strong discontent among millions 
of Moroccans who do not see any incentives 
to participate in the formal system of pro-
duction. On the other hand, and as elabo-
rated above, any reforms seen as detrimen-
tal to the interests of the Palace and its 
clients have been liable to face stiff resis-
tance, and would likely be shot down.  
However, the PJD’s experience in gov-
ernment is not one of complete failure. 
Rather, it has managed to carry out a num-
ber of reforms in the fields of the judiciary, 
higher education, and social solidarity, and 
to realize a measure of political and socio-
economic achievements. 
The PJD has also constantly emphasized 
its role in stabilizing the regime in a shaky 
region, not least by integrating large num-
bers of Moroccans into politics in a fashion 
that has improved rather than undermined 
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stability. Thus, the party has been credited 
for its role in containing the street pro-
tests that shook the regime in 2011, among 
other means by adopting measures that 
previous governments hesitated to take, 
such as salary cuts for protesters in the 
public sector. The government also prides 
itself for having created a new atmosphere 
in politics that is attractive to – rather than 
detached from – citizens. Through his com-
munication skills, Benkirane emerged as a 
TV personality who achieved record num-
bers of viewers, and thanks to him, many 
Moroccans became interested in politics for 
the first time. 
By preserving stability, so the PJD leader-
ship argues, it has actually served the Moroc-
can economy and attracted foreign invest-
ment. For instance, in 2012 the French 
vehicle manufacturer Renault installed a 
giant, 1.5 billion USD plant in Tangiers, 
where it will manufacture around 150,000 
cars annually. Likewise, in February 2013, 
the Canadian aircraft manufacturer Bom-
bardier established a plant in the free zone 
area of Casablanca to manufacture airplane 
components. Such investments contributed 
to an overall increase in foreign direct 
investment of some 25 percent in the first 
half of 2013, compared to the same period 
in 2012, and made Morocco number one in 
North Africa with regards to FDI growth. 
Social measures were also implemented. 
For example, the PJD Minister of Higher 
Education and Scientific Research, Lahcen 
Daoudi, earmarked 1,250 million MAD 
(some 152 million USD) for university 
student scholarships. In 2012 and 2013 his 
ministry created more than 100,000 new 
scholarships and increased the amount of 
scholarships by 70 percent. Hence, today 
some 250,000 university students – of a 
total of 400,000 – benefit from scholarships. 
Likewise, the government created a social 
solidarity fund with some 160 million MAD 
(some 20 million USD) to support divorced 
and widowed women, it increased the num-
ber of Moroccans who benefit from medical 
assistance for low-income citizens, and in 
2012/2013 it handed out support to some 
757,000 pupils and 436,000 families to allow 
them to send their children to school. The 
government also invested heavily in infra-
structure projects and in job creation. 
Last but not least, due to the government’s 
efforts, Morocco gained eight points – 
rising from rank 95 to 87 – in the World 
Bank’s 2014 Doing Business report, which 
assesses the regulations for small and 
medium-size enterprises in 189 countries. 
Maintaining the grassroots 
Although the PJD has been strongly attacked 
by the media and its political rivals, it still 
enjoys considerable public support. Opin-
ion polls confirm that, despite a modest de-
cline in popularity since it took office, the 
PJD has remained the most popular party 
in Morocco and is not likely to lose this 
position in the short term. In December 
2011, just after the PJD had taken office, 
two polls conducted independently of 
each other came out with approval rates 
of between 80 and 90  percent. A year later, 
that improbably high score had receded 
to a still respectable 64 percent. Even more 
significantly, a poll taken in June 2013 
found a mere 13 percent in support of the 
opposition, whereas around 82 percent 
thought that the opposition would not do 
better than the current government if they 
were in power. That the overwhelming 
popular support is not reflected adequate-
ly in parliamentary seats is mainly due to 
the complex electoral system, which is 
designed to create a fragmented parliament 
– and thus a weak coalition government – 
by combining proportional representation, 
excessive gerrymandering (with excess 
weight for the rural areas, which is particu-
larly unfavorable for the PJD, an urban 
middle-class party), and the absence of any 
electoral threshold at the national level. 
Still, to understand the paradox of high 
popularity, in spite of the tense political 
climate in which the party is operating, one 
has to look at the PJD’s approach to politics, 
both from within the government and out-
side of it. First, the party’s communication 
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strategy is quite efficient compared to other 
parties. Beyond its already strong presence 
in conventional media, new media play 
an important role, as does face-to-face com-
munication and portraying an image of 
being connected to the common people. 
Cabinet ministers make a point of empha-
sizing how little their new positions have 
changed them. Even the Prime Minister 
advertises his asceticism: by refusing to 
benefit from allowances and bonuses; by 
living in his old house, which is the prop-
erty of his wife, rather than moving to the 
luxurious official residence in the richest 
quarter in Rabat; and by praying, as often 
as possible, in the same mosque that he 
attended before assuming office. Like him, 
several PJD ministers and MPs make a point 
of keeping some of their previous habits, 
such as frequenting the same cafes and 
popular restaurants. 
Second, the party machine has not been 
affected by the PJD’s participation in gov-
ernment. Institutionally, the party has 
decentralized its structures, and low- and 
mid-level officials that form the organiza-
tion’s backbone enjoy a large margin of 
maneuver for decision-making and manag-
ing local chapters, which concede to them a 
strong grassroots connection. The party also 
benefited from the new resources stem-
ming from its enlarged parliamentary bloc 
(107 MPs, up from 46) and access to services 
provided by local administrations from 
which they were banned while in opposi-
tion. Also, the PJD has been constantly 
forming new cadres from within the party 
and its affiliate organizations, and it has 
revived and enlarged its presence in society. 
For instance, in the months after one year 
in government (December 2012–March 
2013), the party organized around 800 
political gatherings and created around 
150 new local branches throughout the 
country. In addition, it renewed several of 
its functional branches, such as the youth 
and women section, and created new ones 
for doctors, architects, lawyers, etc. 
Third, a wide network of civil society 
organizations associated with the PJD plays 
a major role in maintaining support. The 
creation of the networking initiative Nida’ 
al-Islah al-Dimouqrati (Call for Democratic 
Reform) is an example of such an alliance 
that projects the party’s influence well 
beyond the immediate political sphere and 
into society. It is a PJD-led initiative that 
was launched a few days after the protests 
of the 20 February Movement in 2011 started 
to coordinate between the party and vari-
ous affiliates. This initiative has had three 
main functions: to establish a platform for 
debate and public deliberation, to work 
toward peaceful social mobilization, and to 
allow for the participation in protests with-
out the party being involved directly. 
Regional developments 
Moroccan political dynamics in general – 
and the PJD’s position in particular – have 
not been insulated from regional dynamics. 
In 2011, advocates of democratization ben-
efited from the political opportunity that 
opened up against the background of the 
Tunisian and Egyptian upheavals. With 
the July 2013 military coup in Egypt, the 
regional environment has become much 
less conducive with regards to further 
reform, and some of the gains achieved 
through the constitutional amendments of 
July 2011 may be at risk. Indeed, since the 
overthrow of Egyptian President Moham-
med Morsi, when the King congratulated 
Egyptian Interim President Adly Mansour 
and parties such as the PAM praised the 
coup, the PJD leadership has become wary 
that the Makhzen may emulate the Egyptian 
example and abort the PJD’s experiment in 
government. Benkirane and his collabora-
tors believe that the regional tide might be 
turning against Islamist parties in general, 
and that they need to take heed of their 
local as well as regional political environ-
ments. Hence, they have since opted to 
move cautiously and not press the advan-
tage they obtained through their election 
victory. This likely was also one motive 
behind the significant concessions they 
made in the cabinet reshuffle. 
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There are also concerns that the Arab 
Gulf monarchies may intervene more 
actively to restore authoritarian rule, as 
they did in Bahrain and, in different ways, 
in Egypt. Even though Morocco rejected the 
offer to join the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) in August 2011, in March 2013 it ben-
efited from a 5 billion USD grant from GCC 
countries for a period of five years for devel-
opment projects. Some PJD leaders and in-
tellectuals have voiced concerns over Saudi 
pressures to remove the PJD’s Saad Dine El 
Othmani from his position as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. In the end, although a sim-
ilar development as in Egypt or Bahrain is 
highly unlikely in Morocco’s monarchy, 
with its much less crucial geostrategic posi-
tion, regional interference in government 
affairs and backing of authoritarian resto-
ration are by no means remote possibilities. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
Morocco is at a crossroads today. The rela-
tion between the Palace and the PJD keeps 
oscillating between tense and less tense, 
and the new coalition’s composition risks 
leading toward the government’s failure 
due to persistence of conflicting interests. 
Only if the Palace cedes power to the gov-
ernment and proactively supports its 
reforms will substantial reforms be possible 
and the country be able to navigate its way 
toward a more participatory, transparent, 
and just political order. 
Morocco shares borders with Europe and 
has been a reliable partner in issues, such 
as dealing with illegal migration and secu-
rity. It has therefore benefited from an ad-
vanced association status with the EU since 
2008. The EU has encouraged the Palace to 
achieve limited advancements, for example 
concerning the inclusion of women in pub-
lic life or respect for human rights. Morocco 
has also been included among Arab tran-
sition countries, for example in the G8’s 
Deauville Partnership of 2011. However, 
neither the EU nor the G8 have exerted 
any significant pressure on the Palace to 
increase the pace and depth of political 
reform. 
Germany and its European partners 
should take tangible and credible action to 
support sustainable development as well as 
participatory and accountable government 
in Morocco. First, this should include en-
hanced economic cooperation, above all in 
the field of renewable energy and related 
manufacturing. 
Second, Germans and Europeans should 
support civil society as well as government 
institutions that work for improving gov-
ernance and transparency, such as the Advi-
sory Council on Human Rights and the anti-
corruption agency Instance Centrale de 
Prévention de la Corruption. 
Third, they should include moderate 
Islamist parties such as the PJD and its 
affiliate NGOs in their support for Moroc-
can parties and civil society. This may in-
clude trainings for parliamentarians and 
activists, special programs for youth and 
women, and an intensification of dialogue 
activities. 
Finally, Europeans should insist on due 
process and dealing with the competent 
institutions rather than undermining the 
elected institutions through their dealings 
with the Palace. 
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